​Maritimedata.ai is a single source of access to 200+ data services.

200+ Products

60+ Maritime Intelligence Providers

30+ Years of Experience

​Explore our catalogue​

Insights 📈

Oil & Gas 🛢️

• Import loss, stock build: How China absorbs the Hormuz shock (Link)
• From Supply Disruption to Transit Disruption: What April Reveals About the Global LNG Shock (Link)
• OFAC’s Crackdown on Chinese Teapot Refineries (Link)

Dry 🚢

• China’s soybean imports in March rose 14.9% (Link)
• Agri- Commodities: 27-01/05/26 (Link)
• Firm sentiment in both Capesize and Panamax segments (Link)

Other 🌎

• Maritime Visibility Collapses as Tensions Escalate Around Hormuz (Link)
• America's Major Import Gateways: How Long Beach, LA & New York Performed in Early 2026 (Link)
• Port Congestion Snapshot: Live Vessel Wait Times (Link)

OPEXIT - Gibsons​

Earlier this week, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) confirmed its exit from OPEC. Whilst an exit had been mooted before, the timing of the announcement surprised many given the ongoing Middle East war. With Hormuz effectively closed, and oil production shut in across the region, Abu Dhabi’s announcement will not impact oil markets today. However, in the long term, oil prices, production and tanker demand could all feel the impact.

In isolation, one country leaving OPEC does little to change the outlook. Questions are being asked as to whether the influence of the group has been reduced, yet OPEC will still control around 30% of global oil supply (48% with OPEC+ members), enough to influence supply and with that, pricing. The key question however is; do other notable members follow suit or is this an isolated exit?

In the current market, OPEC quotas are largely irrelevant. However, just a few months ago, the oil market outlook looked very different with OPEC staring at a substantial market surplus following the unwinding of production cuts and rising Atlantic supplies. By 2027, members would have been forced to either cut production or accept lower oil prices; something which could have caused substantial friction amongst members. Instead, oil balances have been flipped entirely, with the market potentially staring at a historic deficit amid rapidly depleting inventories. On a temporary basis, these market dynamics give the UAE, OPEC and producers in the Atlantic scope to continue ramping up production independently, reducing the need for coordinated production policy. As such, it may be a few years before we see the leaner OPEC’s ability and willingness to balance the market being tested.

So, what does this all mean for tankers? Firstly, the UAE will export more. In February, the Emirates 3.4mbd, yet it is widely reported that the country’s production capacity is now as high as 4.8mbd, rising to 5mbd by next year. As such, the country could export around 1.5mbd more once the War ends, subject to the condition of fields and export infrastructure. In the short term, the market can probably absorb those additional volumes alongside increases elsewhere, yet on a long-term basis, supply and demand will need to find a balance meaning that OPEC, or someone else, will need to make way. If the remainder of OPEC are unwilling, the burden will fall on higher cost producers with flexible production i.e. the United States. Lower US output at the expense of higher Middle East exports would ultimately limit the growth in tonne miles given shorter voyages to Asia, yet there would still be tonne mile gain. In an extreme scenario where OPEC fully disbands, oil markets could become more volatile, with output decisions being driven by the production economics and strategies of individual producers, rather than at government level.

With the impact of the decision today being masked by war, the tanker markets will have to wait and see what the real impact is. Yet ultimately, we expect the burden of balancing oil markets to ultimately fall to either US shale, or OPEC, as has been the case for the past decade.

Hormuz crisis slashes VLCC volumes by 36% but voyages are longer - Lloyd's List​

The very large crude carrier market has always been about tonne-miles, but never have the two variables in this equation swung so violently at the same time.

The “tonnes” carried aboard VLCCs are down sharply since the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz. But the “miles” are higher, as more Atlantic basin crude is loading for delivery to Asia.

Shifting flows on VLCCs

Global seaborne crude and condensate exports averaged 36.3m barrels per day in the eight weeks ending May 3, according to data from Vortexa. That is down 6.8m bpd or 16% versus the pre-war average, from January 2025-February 2026.

VLCCs, due to their high exposure to the Middle East Gulf, are down more than other crude tanker segments.

Global crude exports on VLCCs averaged 14.4m bpd over the past eight weeks, down 8.1m bpd or 36% versus prewar levels — the equivalent of four VLCC loads per day — while crude on non-VLCCs averaged 21.9m bpd, up 1.3m bpd or 6%.

Consequently, the VLCC share of seaborne crude exports has fallen to 40% amid the Hormuz crisis, versus 52% in January 2025-February 2026.

The counterbalances to these negatives: VLCCs trapped inside the strait and longer voyage distances have reduced effective capacity.

Sparta Commodities said that there are 58 VLCCs inside the strait; DHT chief executive Svein Moxnes Harfjeld put the tally at 57 during a conference call on Wednesday.

“Approximately 10% of the VLCC fleet is tied up, either waiting to exit the gulf or waiting to load from Saudi Arabia’s western export facility [Yanbu],” Harfjeld said.

Vortexa data shows the voyage distance upside.

VLCC export volumes in the Pacific basin, which includes the MEG, fell to 8.4m bpd during the past eight weeks, down 8.1m bpd or 49% versus the average in January 2025-February 2026.

Atlantic VLCC loadings averaged 6m bpd over the past two months, in line with prewar levels, although the trend in recent weeks is more positive.

In the week ending April 26, Atlantic exports on VLCCs average 8.1m bpd, courtesy of the release of US strategic petroleum reserves.

'The Times They Are A-Changin’ - Poten & Partners​

Since the end of March, the focus of the oil and tanker markets has been on the Middle East in general and Iran and the Strait of Hormuz in particular. There is no doubt that the developments in this region will have profound and long-term implications for the markets. However, in this Tanker Opinion, we want to go back to an event that predates the crisis in the Middle East: The ouster of Nicolás Maduro, the president of Venezuela, who was captured by U.S. special operations forces on January 3, 2026. Under strict U.S. oversight, the Venezuelan oil industry is going through a transformation that has started to show tangible results. The oil price increases as a result of the conflict in the Middle East have given Venezuela’s oil sector a further boost.

Following the capture of Maduro, the Venezuelan oil industry is shifting from a state-controlled, sanctioned sector into a system that is controlled by the U.S. government. The Trump administration has set up a system to get the oil flowing, while ensuring that the revenues do not go to Maduro loyalists. Revenue from oil sales is deposited into accounts controlled by the U.S. Treasury (Foreign Government Deposit Funds). These accounts are established to ensure that the proceeds from Venezuela’s natural resources are benefiting the Venezuelan people and cannot be seized by private creditors.

After the arrest of Maduro, interim President Delcy Rodriguez took over. In coordination with the Trump administration, her administration is pursuing a strategy focused on sustaining high oil output and implementing pragmatic economic reforms to stabilize the country. The initial results are promising: Shipments rose from about 800,000 barrels per day in December 2025 to about 1 Mb/d in March and they reached 1.2 Mb/d in April, the highest monthly level since late 2018. Venezuela’s customer base also changed dramatically. Prior to 2026, China was Venezuela’s largest client, taking anywhere from 50-80% of its crude oil. In 2026 to date, China did not receive any barrels from Venezuela. In 2026, the two largest customers are now the United States (50% of the total) and India (20%). Spain and Italy are the main customers in Europe.

Production growth in Venezuela has been facilitated by a new legal framework implemented by interim President Rodriguez. Foreign companies can now operate, export, and commercialize oil independently, even as minority partners with PDVSA. Royalty rates have been made flexible, potentially dropping from 33% to as low as 15% for joint ventures. Most importantly, new contracts now permit dispute resolution through international arbitration, a major shift to provide legal certainty for global investors.

How we can help:

1. ​Submit your requirement - A member of the team will reach out within 24 hours
2. ​Book a call with the team - Explore which of our 200+ data and analytics solutions align with your needs
   ​

Thank you for your time.

Regards,

James Littlejohn

Co-Founder

Info@maritimedata.ai

+44 (0)208 050 9806

You might be receiving this email because we believe that the content of our newsletter may be of interest to you based on your profession. However, if we have made an incorrect assumption, we apologise for any inconvenience caused. If you do not wish to receive future publications, please follow the instructions below to unsubscribe.