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Oil & Gas 🛢️

• The Clock is Ticking (Link)
• Asia crude slate shifts lighter as Middle East losses deepen (Link)
• Current Russian LNG Supply Picture (Link)

Dry 🚢

• Panamax Supply Outlook as Hormuz Faces Strain (Link)
• Dry Bulk Freight Recap: 17/04/2026 (Link)

Other 🌎

• Iran claims seizure of two MSC-operated boxships while transiting the Strait of Hormuz (Link)
• Supplier Shifts in Global Trade: China Decline, Vietnam Growth, and Rising Execution Risk (Link)
• Transpacific Eastbound (TPEB) Ocean Rates: Up 40% Since Late February (Link)

Transit or no transit - that’s the question - Vortexa​

Since 13 April, the challenge for vessels to enter or leave the Middle East Gulf has been complicated significantly. While in the first 1.5 months of the conflict the full focus was on the Strait of Hormuz, the targeted US blockade on Iranian or Iran-related vessels is geographically much less specific. Accordingly, we have to differentiate two distinct and operationally independent blockades:

• Iranian de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz enforced by the IRGC since 28 February,
• A US naval blockade of Iranian ports initiated by CENTCOM on 13 April, which is not necessarily implemented close to Iranian ports nor within the Strait of Hormuz, but flexibly around an area about 300miles to the West between the Pakistani/Iranian border and the most western “corner” of Oman.

These two instruments target different actors, operate under different legal frameworks, and have different geographic reach. And there is no linkage between the passage of the two blockades. In fact, individual vessels will likely face challenges either

• with the passage of the Strait of Hormuz (non-Iranian vessels or no agreement with Iran - in that case the US blockade is unlikely to apply)
• Or with the US blockade (for Iranian vessels or vessels with close ties/agreements with the Iranian side - in that case the Strait of Hormuz is unlikely to be the challenge)

Understanding this distinction is now the single most important analytical lens for tracking flows, Gulf export disruption, and the prospects for physical market recovery.

Vortexa has observed the following on the water activity for energy tankers related to the US Naval Blockade, focussing solely on sanctioned tankers and those with Iranian links (loaded from Iranian ports currently or in recent months) all other tankers from the eastern part of the UAE or Oman are supposedly free to pass.

→ 34 energy tankers with Iranian links transited the area (inbound and outbound) (April 13 - April 21)

→ 6 dark outbound transits were carrying 10.7mn barrels of Iranian crude (April 13 - April 21), as of April 22, 3 have reportedly been interdicted by the US→ All crude carriers have transited with AIS disabled

Passages via the Strait of Hormuz

In parallel to the US naval blockade, passages through the Strait of Hormuz have not collapsed outright, but have instead shifted into a more selectively constrained transit environment.

Q1 2026 Risk Report: Shipping’s Most Turbulent Quarter in 50 Years- Windward​

A Quarter Defined by Geopolitical Shock

On February 28, the Iran war effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz. Within days, daily traffic through the world’s most critical oil chokepoint collapsed from roughly 120 vessels to a trickle — a 97% drop that left more than 800 ships stranded west of the strait, thousands of seafarers in limbo, and Asian refiners scrambling for crude that could no longer reach them.

It was not the only shock. The quarter opened with the capture of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro, the culmination of a six-week U.S. naval blockade designed to choke off sanctioned oil exports. Within weeks, Washington controlled PDVSA, Venezuelan crude was being redirected to U.S. and European buyers under new licenses, and the blockade had extended to Cuba, where the loss of Venezuelan oil imports plunged the island into rolling blackouts.

Between these two crises, the machinery of global shipping was tested as it has not been in a generation: enforcement agencies moved faster, shadow fleet operators moved faster still, and the gap between U.S. and European sanctions policy widened. What follows is the quarter in numbers, and what those numbers suggest about the rest of 2026.

From Venezuela to Cuba: Blockades Expand

The quarter began with the capture of Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, following a six-week U.S. blockade aimed at preventing Western-sanctioned tankers from exporting the country’s oil. Choking off revenues not only drove regime change but also led to U.S. control of the national oil company, PDVSA. Licenses quickly redirected Venezuela’s crude exports to new markets, including the U.S., Europe, and India, by the quarter’s close.

​The blockade then extended to Cuba, cutting off critical oil imports needed for electricity generation and leading to widespread blackouts.

Enforcement Escalates: Interdictions and Legal Precedents

The blockade drove a global record in vessel interdictions targeting stateless and falsely flagged shadow fleet tankers.

Stateless tankers that evaded the Venezuelan blockade were tracked and detained across the Atlantic and Indian Oceans in January. In doing so, the U.S. demonstrated to EU governments a legal template for addressing Russia’s sanctions-circumventing fleet operating in their coastal waters.

The UK, France, Sweden, and Belgium all detained tankers during the quarter. Thirteen ships were boarded and detained, up 160% from the prior quarter, accounting for half of all interdictions seen across 2025 and 2026. Of these, 92% were sanctioned and 85% falsely flagged.

By April, the interdiction window had nearly closed, as stateless tankers rapidly reflagged to legitimate registries, ending their immediate legal vulnerability.

'Energy Dominance' In Action - Vizion​

The crisis in the Middle East and in particular the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has upended global oil markets. Both crude oil and refined products are now in short supply. Refiners around the world are desperate to get their hands on alternative sources of crude oil, almost at any price. However, the options are limited and dwindling. The volume of Russian and Iranian oil in floating storage is shrinking fast since the U.S. has lifted some of its restrictions, allowing countries to buy these previously sanctioned barrels. Several countries have tapped into their strategic petroleum reserves, but most of this oil is being allocated to domestic refiners and not traded internationally. So, the focus has shifted to the Atlantic Basin, where several producers (Venezuela, Canada, Brazil) have some capability to ramp up production and exports. However, in this Weekly Tanker Opinion we want to highlight the United States.

The United States is by far the largest oil producer in the world. In 2018 it surpassed Russia and Saudi Arabia due to advancements in hydraulic fracturing (fracking) and horizontal drilling. U.S. crude oil exports, which (re)started in earnest after the crude export ban was lifted about 10 years ago, quickly ramped up from 500 K in early 2016 to average more than 4.0 Mb/d in 2023 and 2024. According to data released by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) on Wednesday, exports climbed to 5.2 million bpd, the highest in seven months. This was due to record demand from Asian and European buyers, who are scrambling to replace barrels from the Middle East that are trapped inside the Persian Gulf because of the war. U.S. crude oil exporters are expanding their reach. Greece has bought U.S. crude for the first time ever, while Turkey bought a cargo for the first time in a year. The one limitation that could cap the U.S. export potential is the specifications of the U.S. crude. West Texas Intermediate (WTI), the main U.S. export, is a light sweet crude, while the refiners are trying to replace medium sour barrels from the Middle East. MARS crude is a medium sour grade produced in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico, but its production volumes are limited.

At the same time as exports surged, U.S. crude imports took a dive. Imports from Canada were at their lowest level for this year. Flows from Saudi Arabia and Iraq were down significantly as well, for obvious reasons. As a result, net imports of crude oil (the difference between imports and exports), narrowed to 66,000 barrels per day last week, the lowest on record in weekly data that goes back to 2001. This means that the U.S. nearly turned into a net crude exporter last week for the first time since World War II. Exports are expected to increase significantly in the coming weeks (see Chart 1) and this switch to a net exporter could become reality.

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Info@maritimedata.ai

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