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• Upstream Under Attack (Link)
• Keeping Up With The Joneses (Act)(Link)
• The Strait of Hormuz remains constrained but operational under a clearly selective transit framework (Link)
• 'Zombie ship' uses fake ID to shuttle Iranian oil through Strait of Hormuz (Link)

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• U.S. Overtakes Brazil in Corn Exports to China Ahead of End-Q1 2026 (Link)
• Agricultural Freight Overview (Link)
• Guinea is set to cut bauxite export volumes by early April (Link)

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• How AI is driving global trade (Link)
• Strait of Hormuz Shipping Disruption: Live Information on Container Port Congestion (Link)

How much can we really expect from the Iran sanction waiver? - Vortexa​

At first glance, the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)’s 30-day waiver allowing imports of Iranian oil already on water appears to be a headline solution to the crude market’s supply panic. Combined with Russian barrels, the “additional” volumes potentially made accessible to mainstream buyers partially offset the losses seen in the first three weeks of the conflict.

But how practical is it in reality?

To answer that, it’s essential to understand the current state of Iranian supply. As highlighted in our earlier insights, Iran has been accelerating exports since late last year in anticipation of further disruptions. Exports surged to a record 2.2 mbd in February, outpacing imports even as Chinese discharge activity increased. This imbalance has driven a continued build in floating volumes — a major contributor to rising crude-on-water levels.

As of 20 March — the cut-off load date covered by the waiver — Iranian crude and condensate on water stood at close to 170 mb, with at least 150 mb sailing east of the Strait of Hormuz. The key question is therefore not how much crude is floating, but who controls it. Put differently: if a buyer wants to capitalise on the waiver, who are they actually transacting with?

Who controls the barrels?

For context, Iran established the Energy and Oil Management and Strategy Organization (EOMSO) late last year to streamline energy-related operations. While its exact role in exports remains unclear, its establishment has coincided with a reduction in NIOC’s upstream footprint and a significant expansion of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) role in crude exports. Notably, much of the incremental export growth in recent months appears to have been driven by the IRGC.

Market discussions suggest that roughly 100 mb — about 60% of crude on water — remains under Iranian control, primarily via IRGC-linked entities. The remaining volumes have already been sold to intermediaries or effectively secured by Chinese buyers. This means that any party seeking access to these floating barrels would, in practice, be negotiating with IRGC-affiliated suppliers.

Tehran’s ‘toll booth’ system is now controlling Hormuz traffic - Lloyd's List​

The limited flow of traffic moving through the Strait of Hormuz is now sailing exclusively through an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-controlled corridor requiring specific clearance codes and an Iranian escort service.

Since March 13, a total of 26 vessel transits through the strait have followed a route pre-approved under an IRGC “toll booth” system that requires the ship operators to submit to a vetting scheme.

There have been no transits tracked using Automatic Identification System data via the “normal” route since March 15, according to Lloyd’s List Intelligence data. There are another 21 instances where Lloyd’s List has been unable to confirm a detour given the lack of AIS data.

According to three separate sources with direct knowledge of the new system, vessel operators are being asked to contact approved intermediaries with IRGC connections prior to moving.

They are then instructed to submit full documentation, including IMO number, ownership chain, cargo manifest, destination and a full crew list.

The intermediaries then forward the package to the IRGC Navy’s Hormozgan Provincial Command for sanctions screening, cargo alignment checks that currently prioritises oil over all other commodities, and for what is described as “geopolitical vetting”.

While not all ships are paying a direct toll at least two vessels have and the payment is settled in yuan.

If the vessel passes the Iranian screening, the IRGC issues a clearance code and route instructions. Upon approach, the vessel will be hailed over VHF radio for verification of the codes, and a pilot boat is despatched to escort the ship through Iranian territorial waters, around Larak Island.

Transit payments

In total 142 vessels have transited since the start of the month, but 67% of that traffic has a direct affiliation with Iran (either through trade or ownership). This figure rises to 90% when looking at traffic in recent days.

Loadings of Iranian crude continue at over 1.5m bpd, according to Vortexa. About 1m bpd is assessed to have transited the strait since March 1, although that number might be higher. At least eight very large gas carriers carrying Iranian liquefied petroleum gas have also transited the strait since March 1.

The remaining trickle of non-Iranian ships is made up primarily of Greece-owned or affiliated vessels (15%) and Chinese (10%).

Strait of Hormuz: Managed Dislocation, Not Market Collapse - AXSMarine​

“Diary of a Madman” is one of Ozzy Osbourne’s most iconic albums. The question in today’s market is whether what we are seeing is disorder, or something more calculated. Looking at recent flow patterns across Iran, Venezuela, and the broader Atlantic Basin, the evidence points less to chaos and more to preparation and re-routing.

Iranian Crude Flows: Disruption Without Collapse

AXSMarine data shows that Iranian crude exports have not collapsed despite disruption in and around the Strait of Hormuz. Instead, flows continue through rerouting and operational adjustments, with increased volatility rather than outright interruption.

At the same time, Iranian crude on water built significantly into late 2025, as shown in the stock-on-water chart (Figure 1), with a pronounced accumulation of barrels, particularly across Asian regions.

This build-up phase was followed by a sharp drawdown, visible in the 30-day net change (velocity) chart, where the system experienced an extreme negative swing of roughly 30–40 million barrels over a short period (Figure 3).

While floating storage collapsed during this phase (Figure 2), total crude on water did not decline proportionally once active flows are considered. This divergence indicates that barrels were not removed from the system but converted from idle storage into active transit and discharge.

From Storage to Strategy: Pre-Positioned Supply

The late-2025 move is therefore best understood as a conversion of floating storage into active flow. Floating volumes declined sharply, while transit volumes increased, suggesting that previously idle barrels were absorbed into the system through discharge and movement toward end markets. This reflects sustained absorption capacity rather than supply destruction.

This is why the Iran story is better described as pre-positioned supply rather than resilience by accident. The stock build visible in the earlier phase provided a buffer, while the subsequent velocity-driven drawdown demonstrates how quickly that buffer could be mobilized when demand conditions aligned or geopolitical tensions increased.

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